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ABSTRACT

We examine the distributional changes in consumption expenditure in India between 2011–12 and 2023–24 using unit level data from the NSS-HCES surveys. The absence of comparable official consumption surveys after 2011–12 created a major empirical gap in understanding the distributional change. We analyse the distribution of real MPCE and its inequality across rural–urban sectors, expenditure components, socio-economic groups and states. The real MPCE increased substantially across rural and urban sectors, with faster annualised growth among lower percentiles. All standard inequality measures show decline in inequality. The non-food expenditure remains the dominant contributor to the levels of consumption inequality, but its inequality enhancing role weakened over time, suggesting broader gains in non-food consumption.

Keywords: Inequality in India, Consumption expenditure distribution, Rural–urban and spatial inequality

JEL Codes: D31, D63, I32, R12

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1. Introduction

India did not have a publicly available comparable official consumption survey data for more than a decade after 2011-12, which constrained systematic assessment of poverty, welfare and consumption inequality (Subramanian, 2024). This led to an uncertainty about distributional changes, particularly related to growth, welfare transfers, rural wage changes and employment shifts. The release of HCES 2022–23 and 2023–24 now makes it possible to revisit consumption inequality using official household data (MoSPI, 2024, 2025a, 2025b).

Consumption inequality is important because it has a distinct welfare meaning. Unlike income, consumption captures realised welfare through earnings, smoothing, borrowing constraints, transfers, in-kind access, prices and household capacity (Deaton, 1997; Meyer & Sullivan, 2011). It is therefore closer to material well-being than income alone (Agrawal & Agrawal, 2023). However, it understates economic inequality because it excludes assets, capital income and wealth concentration (Chancel & Piketty, 2019). Thus, declining consumption inequality need not imply structural equalisation; inequalities in assets, education, occupation, caste and location may remain. Using household-level NSS consumption expenditure data for 2012, 2023 and 2024, we construct real monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE)¹ with sector-specific price deflators. Real MPCE allows welfare change to be studied without confounding it with price changes (Deaton & Tarozzi, 2005). We document changes in total, food and non-food real MPCE across rural and urban sector, socio-economic groups and states. We then study distributional change using Growth Incidence Curves and Lorenz curves, following the pro-poor growth literature (Ravallion & Chen, 2003). Finally we estimate inequality using the Gini, Generalised Entropy measures, Atkinson index and percentile ratios that establish the direction and magnitude of change (Cowell, 2011).

The results show a nuanced distributional change between 2012 and 2024. Real MPCE increased in both rural and urban sectors, with positive consumption growth across the distribution. GICs show that lower percentiles recorded faster annualised growth than upper percentiles, indicating a distributionally progressive pattern. Lorenz curves and standard inequality measures confirm that consumption inequality declined during this period. However, this should not be read as structural equalisation. Non-food expenditure remained the dominant contributor to consumption inequality in both 2012 and 2024, although its disequalising role weakened over time. At the same time, state-level variation and the rural–urban divide became more important in the structure of remaining inequality, indicating that residual disparities are increasingly spatially organised.

India's consumption inequality declined, but the decline reflects compositional and distributional change rather than the end of structural inequality. Lower-tail consumption growth, broad-based increases in real MPCE, and reduced dispersion in

¹ Please refer to Table 1 for definition.

non-food expenditure contributed to the fall in measured inequality. However, the remaining inequality continues to be shaped by human capital, labour-market position, intra-group heterogeneity and spatially uneven development. Reducing these disparities therefore requires more than aggregate growth and welfare transfers; it requires sustained attention to education quality, skills, non-farm employment, public goods, regional development, state capacity and rural–urban convergence.

The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on inequality in India. Section 3 discusses methodology. Section 4 presents results and Section 5 concludes.

2. Literature Review

In the absence of the comparable official consumption expenditure data, studies relied on alternative datasets and imputation-based methods. Roy and van der Weide (2022), using the Consumer Pyramid Household Survey (CPHS), find that poverty declined after 2011, though less sharply than national-accounts-based projections suggest, and also report moderation in consumption inequality. Himanshu et al. (2024) emphasise that post-2011 poverty and inequality estimates require imputation and careful comparability adjustments. The recent availability of official NSS consumption expenditure surveys for 2023 and 2024 therefore creates an opportunity to revisit inequality using household-level official data.

India's post-liberalisation inequality experience is layered. During the 1990s and 2000s, liberalisation, trade opening, deregulation and faster growth coincided with poverty reduction and rising average consumption. However, spatial divergence, labour-market segmentation, caste disadvantage and within-group inequality remained important. Deaton and Drèze (2002) show that the 1990s saw poverty reduction along with widening consumption disparities, especially across rural–urban sectors and states. Cain et al. (2010) show that household expenditure inequality was relatively stable during 1983–1993 but increased during 1993–2004, suggesting that the post-reform period marked a distributional break. During 2004–2012, faster growth coincided with rural wage growth, social-sector expansion, MGNREGA, food-security programmes and broader rural demand (Pawde et al., 2022). Jacoby and Dasgupta (2018) document rising real wages in the post-reform period, especially for rural and unskilled workers. The expansion of employment guarantee, food subsidies, pensions, school meals and child-care services also strengthened the lower tail of the consumption distribution (Imbert & Papp, 2015; Drèze & Khera, 2017).

Labour markets form a central transmission channel. India did not follow a classical Lewis-type transition from agriculture to labour-absorbing manufacturing. Instead, labour moved unevenly into construction, informal services, self-employment and a small modern services segment (Mehrotra & Parida, 2019; Sarkar, 2025). Education also shaped inequality change during 1993–2004, as it can reduce long-run deprivation but widen gaps when returns to quality education are concentrated among better-off households (Azam, 2012; Pieters, 2011; Singh, 2012). Trade, technology and globalisation add another layer. Topalova (2010) shows that districts more exposed to tariff reductions experienced slower poverty reduction, while Kapoor (2020) links technological upgrading to labour-market polarisation. These findings make a pure

Kuznets interpretation inadequate for India, where growth was services-led, skill-biased and spatially concentrated.

Spatial and social inequalities remain central. Azam and Bhatt (2018) show that income inequality exceeds consumption inequality and that between-state differences account for an important part of rural between-district inequality. This supports treating geography as a structural dimension rather than only as a control. Since the rural–urban divide and state differences remain important, GEMs are useful because they separate total inequality into within- and between-group components (Shorrocks, 1980, 1982). Social-group inequality is also persistent. Kijima (2006), Borooah et al. (2014), and Singh (2012) show that caste, parental background, occupation, religion and place of birth shape welfare outcomes. These studies imply that SC, ST, OBC and Other groups are internally differentiated; hence within-group inequality is as important as average between-group gaps.

Finally, consumption inequality understates the full extent of economic inequality. India’s top 1% held 22.6% of national income and 40.1% of wealth by 2023 (Chancel & Piketty, 2019; Bharti et al., 2024). Thus, declining consumption inequality need not contradict rising income and wealth concentration. Existing studies document post-reform inequality, spatial divergence, social disadvantage, wage changes, social protection and top-end concentration. However, less is known about the component-wise and group-wise structure of the observed decline in official consumption inequality between 2012 and 2024.

3. Data and Methodology

We use household-level data from NSS consumption expenditure surveys for the years 2012, 2023 and 2024 (MoSPI, 2014, 2024, 2025a). The surveys report household consumption across items, which we group into food and non-food expenditure. The prices are adjusted using Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPI-AL) for the rural sector and Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPI-IW) for the urban sector, with 2012 as the base year². Our primary outcome variable is the inequality of real MPCE. We calculate MPCE for total consumption, food consumption and non-food consumption. Table 1 presents detailed definitions of the variables used in the analysis.

To visualise distributional change, we use GICs and Lorenz curves. A GIC plots the growth in MPCE across the percentiles of the distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the percentage of cumulative MPCE accounted for by various portions of the population when the population is ordered by the size of their MPCE. For the estimation of inequality, we have used multitude of measures including the Gini index and Generalised Entropy Measures (GEMs), given as follows:

$$Gini = \frac{1}{2n^2 \bar{y}} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n |y_i - y_j| \quad (1)$$

$$GEM_{\theta} = \frac{1}{\theta^2 - \theta} \left[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{y_i}{\bar{y}} \right)^{\theta} - 1 \right] \quad (2)$$

² Sector-specific price deflators allow us to account for sectoral cost-of-living differences.

The Theil's T is a special case of the GEMs given as follows:

$$T = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{y_i}{\bar{y}} \log \left(\frac{y_i}{\bar{y}} \right) \quad (3)$$

Where y refers to MPCE, $\bar{y}$ stands for average MPCE, n refers to number of observations, $i \dots j$ refers to individual households, and θ refers to a parameter that can take varying values such as 0, 1, 2 and so on. The use of multiple inequality measures is important because different indices place different weights on the lower tail, middle and upper tail of the distribution (Cowell, 2011).

[Table 1]

4. Results

4.1. Broad Consumption Gains, Progressive Growth

Table 2 reports real MPCE for total, food and non-food³ consumption in 2012, 2023 and 2024. The real MPCE increased substantially at the national level from Rs 1899.76 in 2012 to Rs 2905.56 in 2024, indicating substantial consumption expenditure growth. Rural real MPCE increased from Rs 1519.93 to Rs 2250.75, showing meaningful welfare gains in rural sector. Urban real MPCE increased from Rs 2771.36 to Rs 4201.86, preserving a large urban consumption advantage.

In terms of the composition of the total MPCE at the national level, the share of non-food component in total MPCE was around 53% in 2012. The same for the rural (urban) sector was lower (much higher) at around 47% (60%). Rural sector crossed the 50% non-food expenditure threshold for the first time. The non-food share remained higher in 2023 and 2024 and increased over time. The most notable change is in rural sector. The non-food share rose from around 47% in 2012 to around 54% in 2024.

During 2012-2024, the Real MPCE has grown at the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of around 3.6% at the national level and urban sector experienced marginally higher annual growth (3.53%) than the rural sector (3.33%). During the same period, the real food MPCE grew annually at around 2.76% at the national level, where the growth for the urban sector was higher (3.21%) than the rural sector (2.26). However, in contrast, the growth of real non-food MPCE was higher in the rural sector (4.38%) vis-à-vis the urban sector (3.74%) indicating the catch-up of the rural sector with the urban sector. Across all the levels – national, rural and urban – the non-food component grew higher than the food component, reflecting Engel's law and the standard empirical regularity that the food share declines as real expenditure rises (Lewbel and Houthakker, 2008).

[Table 2]

Figure 1 presents the Growth Incidence Curves (GIC) for the period 2012-2024 for the national level along with those for the rural and urban sectors. The consumption growth is positive across the whole distribution. All three curves slope downward. This means that lower percentiles experienced faster annualised growth than higher percentiles in

³ Separating consumption into food and non-food allows the analysis to distinguish necessity consumption from more income-elastic expenditure.

both rural and urban sector. The growth is more pronounced for the urban sector. This is consistent with pro-poor or distributionally progressive growth in the sense of Ravallion and Chen (2003). The urban GIC lies above the rural GIC. This shows that urban households at the lower-percentiles recorded stronger growth than their rural counterparts. Higher growth for the lower percentiles and lower growth for the top percentiles show relatively equalizing consumption patterns. Consumption growth has become more broad-based, but the inequalities may remain embedded in human capital, labour-market segmentation, social disadvantage, and spatially uneven development.

[Figure 1]

Table 3 presents real MPCE across socio-economic spatial population subgroups during 2012-2024 across rural and urban sectors. Real MPCE increased across nearly all socio-economic groups and states between 2012 and 2024, but the pattern of growth is not distributionally neutral. Urban MPCE remains consistently higher than rural MPCE across nearly every industry, occupation, education level, social group, and state category. A clear consumption hierarchy remains. Modern services, high-skilled work, higher education and better-off states record higher MPCE than agriculture, low-skilled work, lower education and poorer states. This suggests that while aggregate consumption growth has been broad-based, the structure of economic advantage remains closely tied to labour-market location, human capital, and geography.

[Table 3]

The education gradient is especially strong in urban sector. Households with heads graduate-and-above report MPCE of Rs. 5716 in 2024, compared with Rs. 2794 among not-literate households. This indicates that education remains a major channel through which labour-market returns translate into consumption capacity consistent with the observations of Pieters (2011) and Pawde et al. (2022). Occupational differences show a similar hierarchy in the urban sector. Rural graduate-and-above households also consume more than rural not-literate households, but the rural education gradient is less steep than the urban one. High-skilled households remain far ahead of low-skilled households in both rural and urban sectors, confirming the role of skill-biased economic opportunities. The larger high-skill premium in urban sector is consistent with evidence that education, occupation and labour-market segmentation remain central to India's wage and welfare structure (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2024; Jacoby & Dasgupta, 2018; Sarkar, 2025). State-level MPCE variation is very large, making geography one of the most important dimensions of residual consumption disparity. Historically, low MPCE states such as Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha remain far below high-MPCE states and union territories. Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Goa, Chandigarh, Sikkim, and Andaman and Nicobar show substantially higher consumption levels, reflecting spatially uneven development.

Figure 2 maps annual growth in real MPCE across states of India during 2012-2024 for both rural and urban sectors separately. The maps show that consumption growth was spatially uneven across states. The average state-level rural MPCE growth rate is about 3.53%, while the average urban growth rate is about 3.87%, indicating slightly stronger urban growth across states. The median rural growth rate is 3.77%, while the median urban growth rate is 4.49%, showing that urban growth was stronger for the typical state. Rural growth is highly heterogeneous. Similarly, urban growth is also

highly dispersed. Poorer states such as Jharkhand, Odisha, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh show strong rural MPCE growth, indicating a spatial catch-up. High initial MPCE regions such as Kerala, Goa, Puducherry, Delhi, and Ladakh show relatively low growth, consistent with conditional convergence patterns. The urban map also shows strong growth in selected states, but the pattern is less uniformly catch-up-oriented than the rural map. Eight states/UTs are above the rural third quartile of the MPCE growth, and eight are above the urban third quartile, showing concentrated high-growth clusters. This is consistent with the literature showing that spatial location, state capacity, infrastructure and regional labour-market structure shape welfare outcomes in India (Azam & Bhatt, 2018; Deaton & Drèze, 2002; Topalova, 2010).

[Figure 2]

4.2. *Inequality Falls but Concentration Still Persists*

Figures 3a–3c present the Lorenz curves for national, rural and urban sectors. All the distributions are unequal in both years. The rural Lorenz curves appear closer to the equality line than the urban curves, suggesting that rural consumption expenditure is relatively less concentrated than urban consumption expenditure. This may imply that the inequality in the urban sector is higher than in the rural sector. The 2024 Lorenz curves lie above the 2012 curves. This indicates an improvement in the distribution of consumption expenditure. The upward movement of the 2024 curve implies that lower cumulative population groups account for a larger share of total expenditure in 2024 than they did in 2012. Moreover, the improvements are broad-based and not confined only to a few percentiles. The improvement from 2012 to 2024 is consistent with the earlier growth-incidence evidence, where lower percentiles experienced faster annualized consumption growth than higher percentiles. Taken together, the national, rural, and urban panels suggest that India’s consumption distribution became less concentrated between 2012 and 2024, with gains visible across spatial sectors but with persistent rural–urban and within-urban distributional asymmetries.

[Figure 3 a, b, c]

Table 4 presents the estimates of inequality for the years 2012, 2023 and 2024. All inequality measures decline between 2012 and 2024 at the national, rural and urban levels. The national Gini coefficient declined from 0.37 in 2012 to 0.32 in 2024, indicating a clear reduction in overall consumption expenditure inequality. Inequality measured through GE(0), or the mean log deviation, declined sharply from 0.23 to 0.17, indicating reduced inequality that is especially sensitive to changes at the lower end of the distribution. GE(1), or the Theil index, shows an even stronger decline, falling from 0.30 in 2012 to 0.19 in 2024. Rural sector shows the sharpest decline in inequality. The Gini coefficient for the rural sector fell from 0.31 in 2012 to 0.25 in 2024, suggesting stronger equalisation within rural consumption distribution. The GE(0) fell from 0.16 to 0.11, reinforcing the interpretation that lower rural consumption groups gained relatively more over the period. GE(1) declined from 0.22 to 0.12, the strongest relative reduction among the three sectors, indicating a major compression of rural expenditure dispersion. Urban inequality also declined significantly, with the urban Gini falling from 0.38 in 2012 to 0.31 in 2024, but urban inequality remains higher than rural inequality in every year. The GE(0) declined from 0.24 to 0.16, suggesting substantial improvement among lower urban expenditure groups as well. GE(1) fell from 0.29 to 0.17, showing that urban

expenditure concentration at the upper end weakened substantially between 2012 and 2024.

This interpretation follows the standard property that different inequality indices have different distributional sensitivities across the lower tail, middle and upper tail (Cowell, 2011). The Atkinson index declined across all sectors, implying that the welfare loss associated with unequal consumption distribution became smaller over time. The rural–urban hierarchy of inequality is persistent, as rural inequality remains the lowest and urban inequality remains the highest across most measures. Taken together, Table 4 supports the earlier evidence. Consumption grew, lower percentiles gained faster, Lorenz curves shifted upward, and inequality indices declined.

[Table 4]

5. Discussion and Conclusion

In this article, we showed that the India’s consumption expenditure inequality decreased between 2012 and 2024 using household-level NSS-HCES data. The inequality decline was broad-based and structurally uneven. Real MPCE increased substantially across rural and urban sectors, with positive consumption growth throughout the distribution. Growth incidence curves indicate faster annualised gains among lower percentiles, while the upward shift in Lorenz curves and the decline in Gini, GE(0), GE(1), Atkinson and P90/P10 measures confirm broad compression in consumption expenditure. We showed that the decline in inequality was driven by a compositional shift in consumption expenditure identifying non-food expenditure as the key mechanism. Non-food expenditure remained the dominant contributor to consumption inequality because it is closely linked to income-elastic and welfare-enhancing categories. Yet its disequalising role weakened substantially, even as its share in total MPCE increased. This suggests that non-food consumption expanded more broadly across households and became less concentrated over time.

However, lower measured consumption inequality does not imply structural equalisation. Rather, it indicates relative gains in the lower and middle parts of the consumption distribution while differentiation persists through labour-market position, education, social identity and geography. MPCE remains differentiated by education, occupation, industry, social group and state. This points to substantial heterogeneity in assets, job quality, informal income, migration, access to public goods and local economic opportunities among households located within the same broad socio-economic categories. At the same time, spatial components, especially state-level differences and the rural–urban divide, became more salient in explaining residual inequality. The article therefore shows that India’s consumption inequality has declined, but the remaining disparities continue to be organised around human capital, labour-market segmentation, intra-group heterogeneity and uneven regional development.

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Table 1
Description of variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
MPCE (Rs.)	Monthly per capita expenditure of the household is calculated by converting household expenditure in monthly terms and then dividing it by household size. The real MPCE is achieved using Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers for rural sector and Industrial Workers for the urban sector. We use MPCE of the total consumption expenditure, food consumption expenditure and non-food consumption expenditure.
Occupation	A categorical variable representing a household's status of engagement in occupations based on skills. For low skills, medium skills or high skills, this variable takes values 0, 1 and 2, respectively.
Industry	A categorical variable representing a household's status of engagement in industries. For agriculture and allied, non-manufacturing, manufacturing, traditional services and modern services, this variable takes the values 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
Social Group	A categorical variable that representing categories such as SCs, STs, OBCs and others.
Education	This is a categorical variable that takes values as follows: Not literate=0; Literate without formal schooling=1; Primary or below=2; Middle=3; Secondary=4; Higher secondary/diploma/certificate=5; Graduate and above=6.
States	A categorical variable representing all the states and union territories of India.
Sector	A dummy variable that takes value 1 if household is resident in rural sector and 0 otherwise.

Notes: Different survey rounds have followed different occupation and industry classification schemes. For comparability across rounds, we create a concordance table for these variables.

Source: Author's calculations based on unit level NSS HCES data

Table 2
Real MPCE for Total, Food and Non-food Categories During 2012, 2023 and 2024

	2012			2023			2024			% CAGR (2012-2024)		
	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Real MPCE	1899.76	1519.93	2771.36	2762.08	2223.22	3935.46	2905.56	2250.75	4201.86	3.60	3.33	3.53
Real Food MPCE	896.31	799.24	1119.07	1173.92	1014.03	1522.09	1242.80	1045.09	1634.21	2.76	2.26	3.21
Real Non-Food MPCE	1003.45	720.69	1652.29	1588.16	1209.19	2413.37	1662.76	1205.67	2567.65	4.30	4.38	3.74
Share of Non-Food MPCE	52.82	47.42	59.62	57.50	54.39	61.32	57.23	53.57	61.11			
No. of Observations	92255	54813	37442	261746	155014	106732	261953	154357	107596			

Source: Author's calculations based on unit level NSS HCES data

Table 3
Real MPCE across Population Groups (2012-2024)

	2012		2024	
	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Industry</i>	1519.93	2771.36	2224.08	3957.45
Agricultural and allied	1414.56	1960.32	2125.66	3032.07
Manufacturing industry	1692.34	2564.16	2379.27	3884.07
Non-manufacturing industry	1369.23	2282.10	2015.51	3288.88
Modern services	2118.04	3540.40	2816.97	4724.65
Traditional services	1764.58	2447.17	2406.07	3604.79
<i>Occupation</i>	1519.93	2771.36	2224.06	3957.46
Low skilled	1427.74	2032.15	2126.26	3260.29
Medium skilled	1777.05	2636.12	2451.90	3715.66
High skilled	2462.50	3890.80	2913.88	5020.90
<i>Education</i>	1519.99	2771.36	2250.75	4201.86
Not literate	1292.81	1666.73	1999.78	2793.52
Literate without formal schooling	1320.86	1799.75	2029.78	2965.14
Primary or below	1437.35	2004.33	2114.02	3133.39
Middle	1656.28	2207.69	2220.83	3395.74
Secondary	1837.28	2538.22	2504.68	3911.11
Higher secondary & Diploma	2089.36	3040.78	2741.34	5075.81
Graduate and above	2310.94	4826.95	3086.87	5715.87
<i>Social Group</i>	1519.95	2250.75	2771.39	4201.86
ST	1228.63	1807.56	2319.16	3599.67
SC	1342.53	2090.71	2155.06	3377.74
Others	1628.07	2383.86	2898.11	4369.14
<i>States</i>	1519.93	2250.75	2771.36	4201.86
JNK	2168.18	2521.19	2857.23	3632.71
HMP	2740.82	3303.84	4358.12	5957.37
PUN	2191.36	3114.09	2773.90	4181.39
CDG	2378.02	5153.89	3270.51	8361.08
UTK	2061.44	2752.11	3239.07	4394.98
HRN	2124.21	2853.00	3696.05	5139.87

	2012		2024	
	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DEL	2611.18	4196.38	3221.00	5044.87
RAJ	1545.70	2414.12	2444.92	4087.17
UTP	1203.78	1871.60	2250.47	3303.51
BHR	1065.10	1973.62	1514.95	2925.04
SKM	1835.76	5242.59	3067.05	8991.04
ARP	1932.71	3381.66	2695.50	6067.82
NAG	1780.55	2841.53	2507.38	4641.04
MAN	1352.89	2437.99	1456.92	3285.28
MIZ	1827.26	3313.73	2887.12	4867.34
TRI	1592.44	3351.30	2459.58	4536.75
MEG	1582.08	2097.93	2466.69	4642.16
ASM	1435.95	2028.86	2495.68	4079.35
WTB	1236.47	1901.17	2577.76	3306.90
JHK	962.21	1603.47	2287.20	3269.23
ODI	1053.63	1751.95	2040.96	3438.11
CHT	1119.55	1474.70	1871.03	2792.37
MDP	1283.80	1838.67	2387.37	3228.45
GUJ	1720.69	2263.18	2633.47	4029.81
DN	1962.29	2646.03	2798.22	3925.88
MAH	1608.31	2227.06	2980.16	4418.13
ANP	1787.19	2808.80	2786.82	4805.50
KNT	1725.10	2684.55	3500.41	4962.65
GOA	2576.53	4214.87	3228.29	5563.41
LKD	4258.29	3765.59	4201.03	3881.53
KRL	2925.26	3657.30	3554.49	4571.12
TND	2072.43	3050.67	3011.44	4753.16
PUD	2563.56	4121.79	2962.60	4652.56
ANI	3684.58	4390.30	5817.85	5998.87

Table 4
Estimates of Inequality for the National, Rural and Urban Sectors

	<i>2012</i>			<i>2023</i>			<i>2024</i>			<i>% CAGR (2012-2024)</i>		
	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>	<i>(6)</i>	<i>(7)</i>	<i>(8)</i>	<i>(9)</i>	<i>(10)</i>	<i>(11)</i>	<i>(12)</i>
Gini	0.37	0.31	0.38	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.32	0.25	0.31	-1.13	-1.73	-1.58
GE(0)	0.23	0.16	0.24	0.19	0.14	0.19	0.17	0.11	0.16	-2.38	-3.57	-3.25
GE(1)	0.30	0.22	0.29	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.19	0.12	0.17	-3.63	-5.40	-4.20
Atkinson(0.5)	0.12	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.08	-2.67	-4.14	-3.49
P90/P10	4.41	3.53	4.75	4.18	3.34	4.40	3.89	2.97	3.94	-1.05	-1.44	-1.55

Source: Author's calculations based on unit level NSS HCES data

Figure 1
Growth Incidence Curves (2012-2024)






Figure 2
Annual Growth (%) in Real MPCE across States (2012-2024)

Panel (A): Rural



Panel (B): Urban



Source: Author's calculations based on unit level NSS HCES data

Figure 3a
Lorenz Curves (National Level)




Figure 3b
Lorenz Curves (Rural)





Figure 3c
Lorenz Curves (Urban)



Source: Author's calculations based on unit level NSS HCES data